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Abstract 
 
Interactions between economic development and financial development are studied 
by looking at the roles of financial institutions in selecting R&D projects (including for 
both imitation and innovation). Financial development is regarded as the evolution of 
the financing regimes. The effectiveness of R&D selection mechanisms depends on 
the institutions and the development stages of an economy. At higher development 
stages a financing regime with ex post selection capacity is more effective for 
innovation. However, this regime requires more decentralized decision-making, 
which in turn depend on contract enforcement. A financing regime with more 
centralized decision-making is less affected by contract enforcement but has no ex 
post selection capacity. Depending on the legal institutions, economies in equilibrium 
choose regimes that lead to different steady-state development levels. The financing 
regime of an economy also affects development dynamics through a 'convergence 
effect' and a 'growth intertia effect'. A backward economy with a financing regime 
with centralized decision-making may catch up rapidly when the convergence effect 
and the growth inertia effect are in the same direction. However, this regime leads to 
large development cycles at later development stages. Empirical implications are 
discussed. 
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1 Introduction
It has been documented that almost all successful development in history
has involved intertwined institutional and technological changes. Moreover,
such development is always associated with an economy’s catching up to the
more developed economies in terms of wealth and technology. Most promi-
nent examples include the continental European economies in the 19th cen-
tury, Japan after the Meiji Restoration and after World War II, and Korea
after World War II.1 Gerschenkron and Cameron, in particular, have inde-
pendently observed that the banking systems in continental Europe played
an essential role in its catching up in the nineteenth century (Gerschenkron,
1962; Cameron, 1967). Schumpeter (1936) ascertained the relationship be-
tween financial institutions and development. He argued that banks play im-
portant roles in selecting projects that ultimately aﬀect technological change
and economic development.
There is a growing literature that has made great progress in exploring
and testing the relationship between institutions and economic development
(e.g., King and Levine, 1993; La Porta et al., 1998; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ,
2000; Acemoglu et al., 2002). However, many gaps still remain and many
important questions are still being debated. What are the institutional
mechanisms that help or hinder technological change and economic devel-
opment? How are these mechanisms chosen in the development process?
This paper is an attempt to address these questions with a focus on the
financial institutions. We develop an endogenous growth model in which
financing mechanisms, development levels, R&D activities, and economic
growth are endogenized jointly. Financial development is regarded as an
evolution of the financing regimes, together with the economy’s develop-
ment level. In our model, R&D is broadly defined to consist of all activities
that improve knowledge about technology, including imitation, innovation,
and invention.2 Furthermore, exogenously given legal conditions and an
endogenously determined development level aﬀect the choice of financial in-
stitution jointly, which in turn determines the R&D selection mechanism
and eﬃciency. As a result, economies develop along diﬀerent paths. Our
theory has implications for how to measure financial development, how to
explain existing observations, and what new empirical evidence should be
collected. Figure 1 summarizes the basic structure of our model.
1There is a substantial literature to support this claim. Due to space limitations we
do not quote them here.
2Because our definition of R&D, the usual R&D statistical measurements cover only
part of the R&D in our model.
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Figure 1: A model of endogenized institution, R&D, development level, and growth
In our model we analyze the impacts of project selection mechanisms
associated with diﬀerent financial institutions on development. We also
explore how the development level determines the choice of financial institu-
tion. Project selection mechanisms are related to the incentives provided by
the financial institutions to entrepreneurs for R&D. These incentives include
‘carrots’ to reward entrepreneurs and ‘sticks’ to prevent cheating. Our model
focuses on the latter because, in our view, these are particularly important
in dealing with the following important features of R&D: a) the uncertainty
of R&D projects for innovation/invention can be very high such that essen-
tial knowledge for a project is only known ex post; whereas the uncertainty
for imitation is low since reasonably accurate information can be collected
ex ante; b) individuals with R&D ideas usually do not have the resources
to finance projects so they need outside investment; c) entrepreneurs have
informational advantages over projects that they work with, and with these
advantages they may benefit by cheating on the worth of the projects.
Cheating can be deterred if it is punished whenever it is revealed. More-
over, an eﬀective deterrence is a better R&D selection mechanism for in-
novation. However, such punishments can be enforced only when they are
consistent with the financiers’ ex post calculations. But the commitment to
ex post punishments depends on the financing mechanisms. Two types of
financial institutions are studied: regime s with more centralized decision-
making,3 reflecting the conglomerates’ internal financing, ‘relation-based fi-
3When financing decisions are concentrated in the hands of one financier we regard the
corresponding financial institution as a single-financier financing regime, i.e., regime s.
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nancing’4 or a centralized finance system in reality; and regime m with
more decentralized decision-making, reflecting venture capital or syndicated
financing in reality. The institutions of regime s have no commitment for
ex post punishment, i.e., they are associated with a soft budget constraint
problem (SBC);5 whereas regime m is committed to punishing cheating ex
post, i.e., it is associated with hard budget constraints.6
An alternative approach to deal with the R&D-related incentive problem
in our model is to select R&D projects ex ante. Associated with the above-
mentioned R&D feature a), the eﬀectiveness of pre-screening R&D depends
on the information available ex ante. The more novel the project, the less
information available to make ex ante judgments; whereas it is much easier
to evaluate projects that have marginal novelty, such as those involving
technology imitation. Thus a relatively backward economy will benefit from
imitation which reduces the problems of cheating in R&D when projects are
selected ex ante. We model the degree of backwardness of an economy as
the distance from that economy to that of the world frontiers.
Regime m institutions are more eﬃcient in innovation; whereas under
certain conditions regime s institutions can be more eﬃcient in technology
imitation although they are less eﬃcient in innovation. We predict a condi-
tional convergence such that in equilibrium, economies with stronger legal
institutions chose a regime m that leads to higher steady-state development
levels, whereas those with weaker legal institutions chose a regime s. Since
ex ante R&D selection is less eﬀective in solving incentive problems when
the development level is higher and imitation opportunities diminish, this
leads to lower steady-state development levels for regime s.
Another major contribution of our work is to analyze the catch-up dy-
namics by decomposing the impacts of institutions on the development dy-
namics into a ‘convergence eﬀect’ and a ‘growth inertia eﬀect.’ The magni-
tude and the direction of the two eﬀects govern the development dynamics
of an economy. The key factor that determines the magnitude of each eﬀect
is what we discover from the model: the ‘inertia factor’ of the economy.
The ‘inertia factor,’ a measure of the ability to reserve the momentum of
4The term is borrowed from Rajan and Zingales (2003).
5An observable indication of the existence of a substantial SBC problem in an economy
is a large amount of non performing loans (NPL), such as those in transition economies
and in Japan during the last decade. The NPL/GDP ratio in Japan was 15.3% in 2001,
far higher than any other developed economy.
6For the contractual foundations of the commitment problems associated with cen-
tralized and decentralized financing regimes, see Dewatripont and Maskin (1995); for the
contractual foundations of the commitment problems associated with diﬀerent financing
regimes in market economies, see Huang and Xu (1998, 2003).
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growth performance, is determined by institutions. Moreover, it is empiri-
cally observable as the auto-correlation coeﬃcient of the growth rate. At a
catching-up stage, the convergence eﬀect and the growth inertia of an econ-
omy are in the same direction. Thus, a backward economy with a higher
‘inertia factor’ will catch up faster. However, when an economy’s develop-
ment level is close to its steady state, a higher ‘growth inertia’ may make
the economy prone to growth cycles.
Among other factors, the ‘inertia factor’ of an economy is aﬀected by
how much ex ante R&D selection is used in the economy, which in turn is
determined by the financing regime. In general, the ‘inertia factor’ under
regime m is smaller than that under regime s.
Together with the results of how financing regimes determine their steady
state, our theory predicts that the institutions of regime s lead to a fast catch
up when an economy is at an earlier development stage; however, it is likely
to fall into growth cycles around the relatively low steady-state develop-
ment levels. In contrast, although the institutions of regime m may have
higher steady-state development levels associated with more stable catch-up
patterns, their catch-up speed may vary depending on the legal institutions.
These predictions shed light on why economies associated with some fi-
nancial institutions, such as centralized financing or ‘relationship financing,’
catch up quickly at earlier stages but encounter serious problems later even
when investments in R&D are high. Our theory is consistent with some
observed development patterns, including the rise and fall of centralized
economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some moti-
vating observations and discusses the related literature. Section 3 sets up
an endogenous growth model, focusing on the role of financial intermedi-
ation on R&D project selection. Section 4 describes equilibrium financing
regimes, the R&D level, the steady-state growth rate, and the steady-state
development level. Section 5 explores the catch-up dynamics by which an
economy converges with or diverges from its steady-state path. Section 6
briefly provides suggestive empirical evidence; moreover, policy implications
of the theory are demonstrated through simulations. Finally, section 7 oﬀers
some conclusions.
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2 Catching-up Patterns and the Related Litera-
ture
In this section we present some observations motivating our theory. We first
briefly compare the development paths in the last half-century between some
West European economies, where the financial institutions were relatively
closer to regime m in our model, and some Central and Eastern European
(CEE) economies that were under centralized financial systems prior to the
1990s, thus representing an extreme case of regime s in our model. It is well
recognized that a centralized financial system, where all national financial
resources are concentrated in state banks, creates the so-called ‘soft-budget
constraint’ syndrome that is one of the most serious problems in central-
ized economies (Kornai, 1979; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; for recent
surveys, see Maskin and Xu, 2001; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003).
However, the rise of the centralized financing regimes is puzzling, i.e., they
appeared to catch up quickly at earlier development stages, given that the
SBC is ineﬃcient. Moreover, the fall of the centralized financing regimes
is also puzzling, i.e., they experienced a reversed catch-up pattern at later
development stages, given that the negative experience was associated with
their heavy investments in R&D (both in monetary and in human capital
terms). Our model provides an explanation for the rise and fall of the SBC
economies together with their R&D activities.
Presenting the growth rate diﬀerences with those of the world frontiers
by the vertical axis, Figure 7 shows the development paths of four Western
European economies (Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy) for the period
from 1950 to 2000 based on a five-year average (data source: Madison,
2003).7 A regular catching-up pattern consistent with the predictions of our
model (Fig. 5) seems to emerge such that all these economies had catch ups
before the 1980s; thereafter, their catch ups ended with small growth cycles
when their development levels were close to that of the frontiers (from 70%
to 81% of the U.S. level).
In comparison, Figure 8 illustrates the catch-up patterns of some CEE
economies (Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR), which appear to be
7The development path of each economy is plotted in a development level growth rate
space so that the development level and growth rate of each economy can be compared
with those of the world frontiers, which are proxied by those of the U.S., given that the
data come from the latter half of the twentieth century. The development level relative to
that of the world frontiers (hereafter referred to as the development level) is measured by
the ratio of the per capita GDP of this economy to that of the U.S. It is presented by the
horizontal axis.
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consistent with the predictions of our model (Fig. 6). Although associated
with the SBC problem, all the CEE economies underwent fairly rapid catch
ups in their earlier stages (before 1975), together with the rapid adoption of
new technologies.8 However, the catch ups all ended with large growth cycles
when their development levels reached one-third that of the U.S. level.9 The
reversed catch-up trend since the 1980s seems to confirm our prediction that
these economies will decline on a large scale after overshooting.
With respect to the mechanism for the fall of the centralized economies,
we predict an increase in R&D expenditure when the development of regime
s begins to decline. Our explanation focuses on the failure of the financing
regime to deal with R&D. A corresponding fact is that when the catch-up re-
versal occurred, the R&D (both in the civilian and military sectors) in these
economies was among the highest in the world (Tables 1-3). Specifically,
beginning in 1975 R&D intensity in the USSR was the highest in the world
both in monetary terms and in terms of human capital inputs: compared
with the U.S., the R&D intensity and the number of scientists employed
in R&D in the USSR in 1975 was about 47% and 63% higher respectively
(Table 1 and 3).10
Moreover, our theory seems consistent with much of the existing evi-
dence in the recent literature. Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ hereafter) make
major progress in confirming the causality between financial and economic
development after the pioneering work by King and Levine (1993) which
established positive correlations between the two developments. Interpret-
ing regime m/s in our model as external/internal financing11 and relating
8For example, except for in synthetic fibers, the USSR adopted major new technologies
that were introduced in the 1940s and 1950s (oxygen steel making, continuous steel casting,
synthetic fibers, polyolefins, HVAC [300 kv and over], nuclear power, NC machine tools)
around the same time as the UK, FRG, and Japan (Bergson, 1989, Table 10, p.124).
9The data reflecting the collapse of the centralized economies over the last decade are
the last two points on the curves. The basic development pattern of these economies will
not change qualitatively if these data are excluded. The only reason for including the data
for the period from 1990 to 2000 is to present the data in the same way as those for the
West European economies.
10For all countries under comparison, the R&D includes both the civilian and military
sectors. Great care has been taken to rely on the most prominent experts in the field for
the source of our data: we use Madison for the GDP/GNP data; and Bergson and Hanson
for the R&D data.
11 Indeed, regime m in our model reflects such external financing as venture capital, syn-
dicated loans, or other ‘market-based institutions’ that are able to solve the commitment
problem; and regime s reflects internal financing within large conglomerates, financial in-
stitutions with strong government intervention, or ‘relation-based institutions’ that are
unable to solve commitment problems.
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our model to RZ’s work in broad terms, our model predicts that external
financing is essential for the growth of industries with technologies close to
the frontiers of knowledge.12 In contrast, internal financing may be more
eﬃcient for industries with technologies far from the frontiers of knowledge.
The data in RZ show that industries involving more ‘new technologies,’ such
as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and computers, are more dependent on ex-
ternal financing for growth. In contrast, industries involving ‘traditional
technologies,’ such as iron and steel, auto vehicles, and machinery, are much
less dependent on external financing for growth (the industries least de-
pendent on external financing in RZ are tobacco, pottery, and leather) (RZ,
1998, Table 1). Indeed, in the U.S. an overwhelming proportion of the most
innovative R&D projects in ‘new technologies’ were financed by syndicated
venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2001), whereas most innovations in-
volving ‘traditional technologies’ in all developed economies were created by
in-house R&D.13
A high (or low) bank concentration in an economy may make the financ-
ing in that economy closer to regime s (or m). If we interpret the financing
regimes in this way, our theory implies that a higher bank concentration may
be beneficial for catching-up economies, whereas a lower bank concentration
may be more eﬃcient for industries at technological frontiers in developed
economies. Carlin and Mayer (2003) found that bank concentration is neg-
atively correlated with growth in developed OECD economies: a lower bank
concentration is associated with higher R&D shares and faster growth of
externally financed industries. However, for countries at earlier stages of
development, the converse result is found, such that a high bank concen-
tration is associated with faster growth (Carlin and Mayer, 2003, Tables 6
and 8). Moreover, our results about how contract enforcement aﬀects de-
velopment are consistent with empirical evidence that shows that economies
with stronger legal institutions have better financial development and better
economic development (La Porta et al., 1998).
Using data from 72 countries for the 1978-2000 period, a discovery by
Demetriades and Law (2004) also fits well with our model. They found
12A fundamental feature of the frontiers of knowledge in our model is the degree of
uncertainty in innovation. This can be very diﬀerent from merely being the most advanced
in the field. For example, inventing a new drug requires the frontiers of knowledge in
biology and involves high uncertainties, whereas innovations to improve the quality of
steel may not involve very high uncertainties.
13The financing regimes in the U.S. before the mid-nineteenth century (the early
catching-up stage) may further illustrate this point. At that time New England banks
eﬀectively facilitated development. Instead of being commercial banks, they were finan-
cial arms of kinship networks that lended mainly to insiders (Lamoreaux, 1986).
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that financial development has significant eﬀects on growth; the eﬀects are
stronger for economies with better institutions; moreover, for underdevel-
oped economies, the quality of the institutions has a dominant impact on
growth. To link their discovery to our model, we need to mention the follow-
ing features of their data: a) their institutional quality data are essentially
related to the contract enforcement in our model; b) most underdeveloped
countries sampled in their study have financial institutions closer to regime
m in our model.
Our theory is developed based on two strands of literature. The first
is the R&D-based growth literature (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Help-
man, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). The second is the literature on the
commitment problems of financial institutions (or the theory of soft budget
constraints) (Kornai, 1979; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Huang and Xu,
2003), which provides the contractual foundation for our growth model.
Qian and Xu (1998) develop the idea that financing regimes are used
as diﬀerent R&D selection mechanisms dealing with diﬀerent types of R&D
projects. However, the implications for growth or development are only
mentioned are not modeled. In an endogenous growth model Huang and
Xu (1999) study how financial institutions aﬀect growth through their R&D
selection mechanisms. Although this paper notes the implications of R&D
selection mechanisms for catch-up’s economies and for economies at other
development stages, the discussions are very brief and there is no full-fledged
model of these issues. Moreover, since the HX model takes the financial
institution as exogenous and the analysis is restricted to steady states, it is
unable to make most of the predictions generated by our model.
Recent work by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003) studies the selec-
tion of managers related to the growth of firms using an investment-based
strategy and an innovation-based strategy with an emphasis on competi-
tion. Their model creates multi-equilibria and a development trap in that
context. However, they do not focus on the relationship between finan-
cial development and economic development, and they do not derive large
growth development cycles. Accordingly, their model does not make predic-
tions related to the observations that we discuss here (e.g., Fig. 7 and 8;
RZ, 1998; Carlin and Mayer, 2003, etc.).
With respect to our contribution to growth cycles, Matsuyama (1999,
2001) studies possible growth paths cycling between a non-innovative (com-
petitive) phase and an innovative (monopolistic) phase due to the interac-
tion between innovation and the accumulation of capital. In our model we
have imitation vs. innovation, and the growth cycles are determined by the
financial institutions.
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3 The Model
Our model focuses on the impacts of institutional solutions to incentive
problems in R&D on long run growth. In our theory, the Romer model
(1990) is the benchmark model whereby if there is no capital requirement or
information asymmetry in R&D, our model becomes a discrete-time version
of the Romer model. In the following, we start from the benchmark model,
and then add institutional features to the model.
3.1 Production
In our model, consumers are risk neutral and infinitely lived. The represen-
tative consumer’s maximization problem is,
max
P∞
τ=t
cτ
(1+ρ)τ−t
s.t. : bτ+1 = wτ + bτ (1 + rτ )− cτ ,
(1)
where cτ is consumption, and wτ is labor income, bτ is the holding of bond
with interest rate rτ , ρ is the discount rate; in equilibrium, rτ = ρ.
Production in this economy is standard which consists of a final good
sector and an intermediate good sector. The final good sector is perfectly
competitive and it has a Cobb-Douglas technology with intermediate inputs
xit and labor input L1t, such that the output is
Yt = L
1−α
1t
AtX
i=1
xαit , 0 < α < 1. (2)
The firm’s program is
max
xit,L1t
Ã
L1−α1t
AtX
i=1
xαit − (1 + ρ) pitxit − L1twt
!
,
where pit is the price of intermediate good xit, and wt is the cost of labor at
period t. The final good producers pay the intermediate goods producers at
the beginning of each period to get the inputs, and sell their own products
and pay their workers at the end of each period. The optimal demands for
intermediate goods and labor are:
xit = α
Yt
(1 + ρ) pit
xαitPAt
i=1 x
α
it
(3)
and
9
L1t =
(1− α)Yt
wt
(4)
The producer of intermediate good i is a monopolist with the following
profit maximization program:
max
pit,xit
πit = max
pit,xit
{pitxit − xit} (5)
s.t. : αL1−α1t x
α−1
it = (1 + ρ) pit
And its solution is
pit =
1
α
. (6)
The solutions for all intermediate goods producers are symmetric, so the
subscript i can be dropped. Then we have,
xt =
α2Yt
At (1 + ρ)
= α
2
1−α (1 + ρ)
−1
1−α L1t (7)
pt =
1
α
(8)
πt = (1− α)α
1+α
1−α (1 + ρ)
−1
1−α L1t (9)
wt =
(1− α)Yt
L1t
(10)
and
Yt
At
= α
2α
1−α (1 + ρ)
−α
1−α L1t (11)
and
L1t =
(1− α)Yt
wt
(12)
Define w¯ , wt
At
, the ratio of wage-knowledge stock, we have
w¯ =
wt
At
=
(1− α)Yt
L1tAt
= (1− α)α
2α
1−α (1 + ρ)
−α
1−α .
wt = Atw¯ for L1t > 0
and wt is undefined when L1t = 0.
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Then, the profit for every intermediate firm in each period is,
πt =
αw¯
1 + ρ
L1t. (13)
Denoting the steady state L1t as L1, the steady state xt and πt are
x = α
2
1−α (1 + ρ)
−1
1−α L1
and
π =
αw¯
1 + ρ
L1. (14)
The number of new intermediate products introduced in period t+ 1 as
a result of R&D activities at t is determined by the productivity eﬃciency
of R&D sector δ, labor input in R&D sector L2t,14 and the knowledge stock
At, i.e.,
At+1 −At = δL2At, (15)
where, L2t, the labor input in the R&D sector, is determined by the labor
market clearing condition
L2t = L− L1t. (16)
3.2 Financial Intermediation and R&D
In our model, we assume that R&D is uncertain and is subject to incentive
problems, whereas all other productions are certain. A major function
of financial intermediaries is to solve the entrepreneurs’ incentive problems
when they finance uncertain R&D projects.
The incentives to be provided involve ‘carrots’ to reward entrepreneurs
and ‘sticks’ to prevent cheating. The latter issue is particularly serious and
diﬃcult for R&D due to the following features of R&D: a) individuals with
R&D ideas usually have no wealth to finance projects such that they need
others’ wealth as investment; b) R&D projects can be highly uncertain such
that ex ante financiers may not be able to know which project is worth doing.
Although ex ante it seems to be obvious that cheating can be deterred by
severe punishment once it is revealed ex post, such punishments will be
enforced only when the ex post punishment is consistent with financiers’ ex
post benefits. That is, only when ex post punishment is time consistent for
14Here, a crucial departure from the standard Romer model arises. As will be elaborated
upon the next subsection, each R&D project needs capital inputs to complement one unit
of labor input.
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the financiers can the incentive problem be solved properly and this depends
on the financial institutions.
To deal with the R&D incentive problem in a growth model, in our econ-
omy there are always some consumers who can generate innovative ideas
during every period following an independent identical stochastic distrib-
ution. The consumers with innovative ideas will become entrepreneurs if
their ideas are financed. The i.i.d. assumption implies that no entrepreneur
can automatically continue to be an entrepreneur during the next period.
We assume that there are two possible types of every project proposed by
an entrepreneur: a good type and a bad type. The returns of the two types of
projects are the same — the present value of profits, δAt
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ
(notice that δL2At is the number of new R&D outcomes introduced in pe-
riod t+ 1 and each R&D project uses one unit of labor). But the costs of
the two types of projects diﬀer. For a project being carried out in period t,
a good type takes two stages to complete, requiring (capital) investments I1t
and I2t; and it is profitable. However, a bad type takes three stages to com-
plete requiring (capital) investments I1t, I2t and I3t and it is unprofitable.
Moreover, we also assume that all early stage investments to a bad project
I1t and I2t are sunk, such that a bad project’s liquidation value at stage 2
is zero. The magnitude of each investment is given by Iit = IiAt, where Ii
is constant, for i = 1, 2 and 3.
With respect to information, when a project is proposed by an entrepre-
neur, no one (including the entrepreneur) knows the type of each project,
although it is a common knowledge that the probability that it is a good
(bad) type is q (q¯ , 1 − q). Facing unknown-type R&D projects and po-
tential losses associated with financing bad type projects, financiers may do
better to select projects ex post by eliminating bad ones once the projects’
types become known, i.e., if the financiers commit not to make last stage
investment I3t. However, this ex post selection mechanism may not be im-
plemented if investing I3t can make a bad project ex post profitable, unless
investing I3t makes an ex post loss due to some additional transaction costs.
To study R&D selection mechanisms, we model two alternative financing
regimes: a multi-financier financing regime (regime m, with a dispersed
claim structure) and a single-financier financing regime (regime s, with a
concentrated claim structure). We suppose that a transaction cost
Ft = FAt
is incurred whenever a project is to be re-financed by multi-financiers at
stage 2, where F ∈ R+. Ft may be justified as a negotiation cost due to
12
the conflict of interests and asymmetric information among the co-financiers
under the regime m. When a project is financed by regime s, this trans-
action cost does not appear.15 In the following we summarize our major
assumptions in an intuitive way; formal expressions of these assumptions
can be found in Appendix A.
A-1 Financing a bad project is ex ante unprofitable.
A-2 Given that earlier investments are sunk, financing a bad project at its
last stage is ex post profitable.16
A-3 With the transaction cost Ft, financing a bad project at its last stage
is ex post unprofitable.17
To describe the incentive problems in financing R&D, we illustrate the
stages of R&D financing in period t as follows:
Stage 0 Financiers choose the financial institution — regime s or m. Poten-
tial entrepreneurs propose R&D projects to financiers under a chosen
regime when no one knows the types of proposed projects. Based on
ex ante selection, which is to be analyzed in the next subsection, fi-
nanciers make take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀers to the proposers of the
chosen project. If a contract is signed, the project proposer becomes
an entrepreneur and the financier(s) invest I1t units of money into the
project during stage 1. Stage 1 takes no time and requires no labor
input.18
Stage 1 An entrepreneur learns the type of the project proposed. How-
ever, the financier(s) still does (do) not know the type of the project
and stage 2 of R&D is launched (unless a project is stopped by the
entrepreneur), which requires I2t units of capital and one unit of labor
15This cost Ft can be regarded as a reduced form of the endogenized renegotiation costs
in Huang and Xu (1998, 2003). Moreover, there is a literature on diﬀerent reasons why
costs will be higher when there are more parties involved (e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin,
1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Hart and Moore, 1995).
16This assumption is a variation of similar assumptions made by Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995); Qian and Xu (1998).
17This assumption is a reduced form of the results in Huang and Xu (1998, 2003).
18Relaxing this simplification assumption will not change the model qualitatively. A
justification for the assumption is the following. Suppose testing a proposed idea is quick,
then the time spent on it can be ignored. Moreover, suppose the number of people
working on it can be very small, then compared with the later stage, it is small enough to
be ignored.
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inputs. If the entrepreneur stops the project, he gets a low private
benefit b1 > 0.
Stage 2 All good projects are completed, thus the types of the projects be-
come common knowledge. For a good project, all the financial returns
go to the financier(s) and the entrepreneur gets a high private benefit
of bg. All bad projects are incomplete, thus they have no return and
their liquidation values are zero. The financier(s) decide either to con-
tinue, or to liquidate them. If a project is liquidated the financier(s)
get(s) zero return and the entrepreneur loses, i.e., the private benefit
is b2 < b1. If it is to be reorganized, I3t will be invested. To simplify
the model, we assume no further labor input is required to continue.
Stage 3 Bad projects are completed. All the financial returns go to the
financier(s) and the entrepreneur gets a moderate private benefit, bb ∈
(b1, bg).
Given assumption A-2, financiers under regime s will continue to invest
in bad projects at stage 2. Anticipating this, entrepreneurs with bad projects
will lie at stage 1 to benefit from continuing bad projects. However, following
A-3, financiers under regime m will liquidate bad projects at stage 2. Facing
the credible threat of liquidation of bad projects at stage 2, entrepreneurs
endowed with bad projects will stop bad projects “voluntarily” at stage 1 to
avoid heavier losses later. These results are summarized in the following.19
Lemma 1 : Under regime s all bad projects will not be stopped, i.e., there
is a pooling equilibrium. Under regime m all bad projects will be liquidated
at date 1, i.e., there is a separating equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above lemma shows that through its commitment to liquidate bad
projects at date 2, the decentralized nature of regime m provides incentives
for entrepreneurs to honestly disclose information about the quality of the
projects. In contrast, financial systems where key decisions are made by a
single agent (regime s) do not have a commitment to liquidate bad projects
ex post. Without a commitment entrepreneurs under this regime will hide
bad news about their projects. Examples of regime m, or a dispersed claim
structure, are syndicated venture capital financing and decentralized finan-
cial markets such as equity markets; whereas examples of regime s include
19There are other possible contractual foundations that we can use to derive the
Lemma1, such as internal influence activities within regime s (Milgrom, 1988).
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large firms’ internal financing (e.g. conglomerates) or in-house R&D; a cen-
tralized economy is an extreme example (see Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995;
Qian and Xu, 1998).
Regime m involves multi-party contracts. Thus, law enforcement such
as contract enforcement, accounting standards, etc. will aﬀect its operation.
To capture this, we suppose that when a project is to be financed at stage
0, regime m will involve a transaction cost σFAt, σ ∈ [0, 1] when a project
is started to align the interests of investors and entrepreneurs. In short, we
call σ an institutional cost. This institutional cost σ reflects the degree of
imperfection of the legal infrastructure with respect to the costs involved in
multi-party contracts. In an economy with perfect law enforcement, σ = 0;
but in an economy with imperfect legal institutions, σ > 0 ; moreover, the
more imperfect the legal institutions the higher σ.20
With respect to the ‘waste’ caused by bad projects in the two regimes,
in the benchmark case of regime m (i.e. σ = 0), the present value of ex-
pected ‘waste’ for each complete project due to liquidating a bad project
is (1− q) I1
q
. In comparison, under regime s the present value of the ex-
pected ‘waste’ due to extra costs involved in the final stage of financing is
(1− q) I31+ρ . In this paper we make an assumption that regime s has higher
‘waste’ than regime m. Formally we have the following.
A-4: q I31+ρ > I1 (benchmark regime m waste less than regime s).
Furthermore, we assume that to produce intermediate goods from a com-
pleted R&D project takes no time. Although it is a simplification assump-
tion, a plausible example is that of producing a software package in a large
scale when the code is there. Finally, we assume that the law of large
numbers applies whenever appropriate. Therefore, we use mathematical
expectations to replace the average of samples throughout the rest of the
paper.
3.3 Pre-screening and Development Level
At its best, ex post selection is at the expense of I1; at its worst, it does
not exist (in regime s). As an alternative R&D selection mechanism, in our
model financiers also select projects ex ante, which we call “pre-screening”.
This also captures important features of technology imitation. We assume
that the eﬀectiveness of ex ante project selection depends on the quality of ex
20This transaction cost σ or σFAt can be seen as a reduced form of endogenized law
enforcement cost in Xu and Pistor (2002). The assumption that regime s does not incur
cost σ is not only a simplification but also captures the idea that a regime s, such as
conglomerates, is an institutional substitute when the market is less developed.
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ante information on R&D projects, which is determined by how far an econ-
omy is from the technology frontier. Supposedly, imitation-featured R&D
projects (e.g., reverse engineering, etc.) are less uncertain and it is easier to
make ex ante judgments about the projects; then a backward economy may
rely more on ex ante selection, which allows for trying new technologies at
a lower cost.21
Formally, we suppose that by investing κt, a prior signal can be collected
about the quality of a project before starting it. The precision of the signal,
i.e., the probability that a signal is correct, is θ, where θ ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
. We also
suppose that the pre-screening cost increases in the development level and
in the pre-screening precision. That is, we assume κt = κ (at, θ)At, where
at , AtAft is the relative development level of an economy and Aft is the
world frontier of knowledge stock. Aft grows at a constant rate gf , which is
to be determined endogenously. We make the following assumption about
the properties of the pre-screening cost function κ.
A-5: κ = λ (at)ψ (θ) where, ψ
¡
1
2
¢
= 0, ψ (1) = ∞, ψ0 (·) > 0, ψ00 (·) >
0;22 λ (0) = 0, λ0 (·) > 0, λ (·) ≤ 2q¯I1
ψ0( 12)
.23
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Endogenous Financing Regime
We model a continuum of economies in the world with σ ∈ [0,∞). For
any period t at stage 0, after receiving R&D proposals from entrepreneurs,
financiers choose the optimal financing regime and pre-screening precision
{ζ, θζ} to maximize the expected net present value (NPV) of the projects
they finance, where ζ is the regime variable, ζ ∈ {m, s}, and θζ is the pre-
screening precision under a chosen regime ζ. In the following, we analyze the
two financing regimes, and then we look at how at the equilibrium financing
structure and the equilibrium pre-screening precision.
21This approach captures the Gerschenkron eﬀect of the ‘advantage of backwardness’
(1962).
22One example which satisfies these conditions is ψ (θ) = θ−
1
2
1−θ .
23When this upper bound is respected, the equilibrium level θ is an interior solution,
i.e., some pre-creening is desirable regardless of the country characteristics and the stage
of development.
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For a project financed under regime s, the expected NPV is
ENPV s = qθs
Ã
∆At+1
L2
∞X
τ=t+1
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ − I1t − I2t −
wt
1 + ρ
!
+
q¯θ¯s
Ã
∆At+1
L2
∞X
τ=t+1
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ − I1t − I2t −
I3t
1 + ρ
− wt
1 + ρ
!
−Atλψ (θs)
= qθs
Ã
δ
∞X
τ=t+1
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ − C¯s
!
At, if L1t > 0, (17)
24where qθs , qθs + q¯θ¯s and
C¯s ,
λψ (θs)
qθs
+ I1 + I2 +
w¯
1 + ρ
+
q¯θ¯s
qθs
I3
1 + ρ
(18)
is the expected cost of completion of one project. (Note: if L1t = 0, then
wt 6= w¯At, i.e., the wage rate is not determined by the final good sector.)
Similarly, for a project financed under regime m, the expected NPV is
ENPVm = qθm
Ã
∆At+1
L2
∞X
τ=t
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ − I1t − I2t −
wt
1 + ρ
− σFt
!
−q¯θ¯m (I1t + σFt)−Atλψ (θm)
= qθm
Ã
δ
∞X
τ=t+1
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ − C¯m
!
At, if L1t > 0, (19)
25where
C¯m ,
λψ (θm)
qθm
+
qθm + q¯θ¯m
qθm
(σF + I1) + I2 +
w¯
1 + ρ
(20)
is the expected cost of completion of one project. In a competitive capital
market only the most eﬃcient financing regime survives. The following
result reflects this intuition.
Proposition 2 With free-entry in the capital market, the equilibrium fi-
nancing regime minimizes the expected capital cost of a completed project,
i.e., at equilibrium a regime is chosen such that (ζ∗, θ∗) = argmin
©
minθs C¯s,minθm C¯m
ª
.
24For the corner solution that L1t = 0 the condition is ENPV s =
qθs
³
δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t) πτ − C¯s +
³
wt
At − w¯
´´
At.
25For the corner solution that L1t = 0 the condition is ENPVm =
qθm
³
δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t) πτ − C¯m +
³
wt
At − w¯
´´
At
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Proof. The financiers choose the optimal selection regime (ζ, θ) to maximize
the expected NPV of the projects they finance, i.e., to solve the following
program:
max
ζ,θ
ENPV = max
½
max
θs
ENPV s,max
θm
ENPVm
¾
. (21)
Given free entry into the capital market, a break-even condition ensues, i.e.,
maxζ,θ ENPV = 0. (Otherwise, an eﬃcient outside financier would find it
profitable to enter, or an inside financier would find it profitable to quit.)
Using eq. (17) and (19), it is easy to verify that
δ
∞X
τ=t
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ
= min
½
min
θs
C¯s,min
θm
C¯m
¾
for L1t > 0,
26and argmin
©
minθs C¯s,minθm C¯m
ª
is the solution to the program (21).
We define the minimum expected cost of completing a project under
regime s as C¯∗s , minθs C¯s, the minimum cost under regime m as C¯∗m ,
minθm C¯m, and the cost at equilibrium as C¯
∗ , min
©
C¯∗s , C¯
∗
m
ª
. Then
applying Proposition 2, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 If C¯∗s < C¯
∗
m, then the equilibrium financing regime is regime
s; if C¯∗s > C¯
∗
m, then the equilibrium financing regime is regime m.
We denote the optimal pre-screening precision under the two regimes as
θ∗s and θ
∗
m respectively, and define the optimal average pre-screening costs
under the two regimes as K∗s , λψ(θ
∗
s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
and K∗m , λψ(θ
∗
m)
qθ∗m
respectively. The
following Lemma shows comparative statics with respect to the institutional
cost σ. (For other comparative statics of the model, please see Lemma 25
and 26 in Appendix B.)
Lemma 4 dC¯
∗
s
dσ
= 0, dθ
∗
s
dσ
= 0 and dK
∗
s
dσ
= 0; dC¯
∗
m
dσ
> 0 and ∂θ
∗
m
∂σ
> 0 and
dK∗m
dσ
> 0 for λ > 0. Moreover, if σ = 0, then C¯∗s > C¯
∗
m for λ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
26For the corner solution that L1t = 0 the condition is δ
P∞
τ=t (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t) πτ =
min
©
minθs C¯s,minθm C¯m
ª
+
³
wt
At − w¯
´
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This lemma suggests that ceteris paribus under regime m, with a high
σ the financiers will spend more on pre-screening and achieve a higher pre-
cision, and the expected capital cost of R&D will be higher. In contrast,
under the regime s, the change of institutional cost σ has no impact on pre-
screening. The last part of the lemma establishes the benchmark case when
there is no institutional cost.
Based on the above discussions, the following result demonstrates the
determinants of regime choice.
Proposition 5 For λ (a) > 0, there exists a threshold σ˜ (λ) > 0 such that
regime s is chosen if and only if σ > σ˜ (λ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 5. In the figure, a σ˜ (λ)
curve partitions the (λ (a) , σ) space into two regions: in the upper region
regime s prevails; in the lower region, regime m rules. It shows that the
choice of financing regime is jointly determined by the exogenous ‘institu-
tional cost’ σ and the relative development level a through λ (a). For a given
development level a, or λ (a), when the institutional cost is high in compar-
ison with the threshold value σ˜, at equilibrium regime s will be chosen; but
if the institutional cost is lower than σ˜, regime m will be chosen.
  
λ 
σ   
0  
Regime  m  
Regime  s ( )λσ~
Figure 2: Endogenous financial regimes
4.2 Growth
In order to establish the foundation for examining how growth and financing
regimes interact, we first establish the laws of motion, and then characterize
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the steady state of the system. A complete characterization of the dynamics
of the growth paths is in Section 5.
4.2.1 Growth Equations
Let gt , At+1−AtAt be the rate of growth (of knowledge stock) in period t. We
suppose that there is free entry into the R&D sector and the capital market.
Focusing on interior solutions that 0 < gt < δL, the number of completed
projects in each period is determined by the following arbitrage condition
(in equilibrium the expected cost of capital is the same as the asset value of
a completed project):27
δ
∞X
τ=t+1
(1 + ρ)−(τ−t) πτ| {z }
PV of profit from completing a project
=
costs of completing a projectz }| {
C¯∗ (λt) (22)
where πτ is the expected profit per product in period τ .28
From the diﬀerence in the arbitrage conditions for period t and period
t+ 1 we have
1
1 + ρ
δπt+1 = C¯
∗ (λt)−
1
1 + ρ
C¯∗ (λt+1) . (23)
The left-hand side of eq. (23) is the present value of the next period per
project dividends to the investors; the right-hand side of eq. (23) is the
diﬀerence of the present values between the current and next period costs
of capital, or between the current and next period per project asset values.
Given that λt = λ (at) and at+1 = at
1+gt
1+gf
, and by combining eq. (13),
(15), and (23), we have the following system of diﬀerence equations, which
characterizes the dynamics of the economy: on the one hand, the current
relative development level, at, aﬀects the way of financing, which in turn
aﬀects the R&D cost and future growth rate, gt+1; on the other hand, the
growth rate gt, aﬀects the future development level, at+1.(
at+1 = at
1+gt
1+gf
gt+1 =
1+ρ
αw¯
C¯∗
³
λ
³
at
1+gt
1+gf
´´
− (1+ρ)
2
αw¯
C¯∗ (λ (at)) + δL.
(24)
27The conditions for corner solutions are, δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t) πτ ≤ C¯∗ (λt) for gt = 0
and δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t) πτ = C¯∗ (λt) +
³
wt
At − w¯
´
≥ C¯∗ (λt) for gt = δL.
28 In this economy, everyone complying with eq. (22) is a Nash equilibrium. This is
because the best one can do in this economy is to gain zero-profit, which can be achieved
by complying with eq. (22). Any deviation from the strategy implied by eq. (22) is not
profitable given that all other players follow it.
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4.2.2 Steady State Growth under Diﬀerent Regimes
To facilitate our analysis, we define the benchmark economy as the case that
there is no institutional cost, i.e., σ = 0, and that the knowledge stock is at
the world frontier, Aft. Moreover, we define the development level of this
economy as the benchmark level, i.e., at = 1; and the benchmark knowledge
stock Aft grows at a constant growth rate gf ,
Aft = Af0 (1 + gf )
t
.
By definition, in a steady state, gt+1 = gt and at+1 = at = a¯ > 0, where
a¯ is time-invariant. Applying these definitions to eq. (24), we have gt = gf
and
δL =
ρ (1 + ρ)
αw¯
C¯∗ (λ (a¯)) + gf . (25)
To summarize we have,
Lemma 6 The point (a¯, gf ) is a steady state (rest point) of (at, gt), where
a¯ is defined as the solution to C¯∗ (λ (a¯)) =
αw¯(δL−gf)
ρ(1+ρ) .
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on this steady state and
call it the steady state, although there exists another steady state, which is
trivial and unstable.29
In steady state, all economies’ R&D capital costs are equalized to that
of the frontier economy (the benchmark), which is a constant.
Lemma 7 In the steady state, gt = gf ; C¯∗ζ = C¯
∗
f where ζ = m, s.
Proof. By substituting eq. (25) into (24) we obtain
gt+1 =
1 + ρ
αw¯
µ
C¯∗
µ
λ
µ
at
1 + gt
1 + gf
¶¶
− C¯∗ (λ (at))
¶
+
ρ (1 + ρ)
αw¯
¡
C¯∗ (λ (a¯))− C¯∗ (λ (at))
¢
+gf .
(26)
Then it is obvious that in the steady state (gt+1 = gt = gf ) we must have
C¯∗ (λ (at)) = C¯
∗ (λ (a¯)) .
Noticing that C¯∗ (λ (a¯)) =
αw¯(δL−gf)
ρ(1+ρ) , which is constant regardless of σ, and
denoting C¯∗ (λ (a¯)) by C¯∗f and C¯
∗ (λ (at)) by C¯∗ζ .
29The trivial steady state is at+1 = at = 0 and gt+1 = gt =
ρ(1+ρ)
αw¯
¡
C¯∗ (f (a¯))− C¯∗ (f (0))
¢
+ gf . This steady state is unstable. For the proof of
the result, see Lemma 28 in Appendix B.
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The intuition behind this Lemma is that the fixed eﬀects (σ’s) associated
with the diﬀerences among the diﬀerent economies are compensated for by
the adjustment in the relative development level and the way of financing.
Based on this Lemma, we have the following proposition. The intuition
of this result is related to the cost minimization of the financing regimes
(Proposition 2).
Proposition 8 In steady state a financing regime is chosen as if in each
economy there were a social planner who has the objective of maximizing the
economy’s steady state development level a¯.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the following we apply Lemma 7 to characterize the optimal regime
selection in a steady state. For an economy under regime m, using eq (20)
in the steady state, we have
C¯∗m =
λ (ass)ψ (θ
∗
m)
qθ∗m
+
qθ∗m + q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m
(σssF + I1) + I2 +
w¯
1 + ρ
= C¯∗m
¯¯
σ=0,a=1
,
(27)
where θ∗m is the optimal pre-screening precision in the regime, which depends
on λ and σ; since λ = λ (a¯) in a steady state, θ∗m is an implicit function of
(a¯, σ). We define the relationship between the steady-state development
level ass and the institutional cost σss under regime m as a set:
Ωss ,
©
(ass, σss) : (ass, σss)⇒ C¯∗m = C¯∗f , i.e., eq. (27)
ª
.
It is obvious that σss is an implicit function of ass and it satisfies the fol-
lowing property.
Lemma 9 σss (ass) decreases in ass; particularly, σss > 0 when ass = 0;
and σss = 0 when ass = 1.
Proof. Using eq. (27) and the envelope theorem, then
dσss
dass
= − ψ (θ
∗
m)λ
0 (ass)¡
qθ∗m + q¯θ¯
∗
m
¢
F
< 0, (28)
which implies a negative, one-to-one mapping, hence, a functional relation-
ship between ass and σss.
Similarly, applying Lemma 7 we have the following result.
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Lemma 10 (a∗, gf ) is the steady state for any economy under regime s.
Proof. Applying Lemma 7 to eq. (18) we have
C¯∗s =
λ (a∗)ψ (θ∗s)
qθ∗s + q¯θ¯
∗
s
+ I1+ I2+
w¯
1 + ρ
+
q¯θ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s + q¯θ¯
∗
s
I3
1 + ρ
= C¯∗m
¯¯
σ=0,a=1
, (29)
where θ∗s is optimal pre-screening precision under regime s and a
∗ is the
unique solution to eq. (29).
To facilitate our analysis on determination of financing regimes in the
steady state, corresponding to a∗ we denote σ∗ = σss (a∗). By definition,
(a∗, σ∗) ∈ Ωss. The following result demonstrates how financing regimes are
chosen at the steady state.
Proposition 11 With endogenized financing regimes, in the steady state,
if σ ≥ σ∗, then regime s is chosen and a¯ = a∗; if σ < a∗, then regime m is
chosen and a¯ > σ∗ where (a¯, σ) ∈ Ωss, with da¯dσ < 0, particularly, a¯ = 1 as
σ = 0.
Proof. From eqs.(27 and 29), (a∗, σ∗) is a solution to the condition C¯∗s =
C¯∗m. Applying Lemma 4 (
dC¯∗s
dσ
= 0 and dC¯
∗
m
dσ
> 0) and Proposition 2, if
σ ≥ σ∗, then regime s is chosen and a¯ = a∗; if σ < a∗, then regime m is
chosen. Consequently, from Lemma 9 we have da¯
dσ
< 0 hence, a¯ > a∗.
The following Figure 3 illustrates endogenized financing regimes in the
steady state (Proposition 11). The σc curve partitions the (a, σ) space into
a regime m region and a regime s region, whereby the two diﬀerent regimes
have comparative advantages in minimizing R&D costs respectively (see
Proposition 5). The bold σss curve and the connecting vertical line are the
sets of the steady state for economies with σ < σ∗ and σ > σ∗ respectively.
Instead of a universal convergence, economies converge to two ‘clubs’: steady
state economies with σ < σ∗ go to the regimem club and economies with σ >
σ∗ go to the regime s club. Related to this institutional divide, economies
also diﬀer in their steady state development levels: countries in the regime
m club are wealthier than those in the regime s club.
The two regimes put diﬀerent weights in ex ante R&D project selection.
Lemma 12 In the steady state K∗s > K
∗
m if I3 > I˘3 where I˘3 is a finite
threshold.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Figure 3: Endogenous financial regimes and their steady states (The arrows
indicate the convergence eﬀects)
Lemma 12 says that regime s spends more on pre-screening than regime
m in the steady state. This is because regime s does not have ex post
screening capacity and pre-screening serves as a substitute. In the remainder
of the paper, we will focus on the case of I3 > I˘3. This condition will not be
mentioned unless we note otherwise. Given regime s selects projects only
ex ante, it is more demanding than regime m in pre-screening. As a result,
when R&D is more uncertain, regime s selects a smaller portfolio of R&D
projects to begin with.
Proposition 13 In the steady state, regime s imposes higher standards than
regime m in pre-screening, i.e., θ∗s > θ
∗
m. Moreover, when projects are more
uncertain (q < 12) regime s has a lower acceptance rate in pre-screening than
regime m, i.e., qθ∗s + q¯θ¯
∗
s < qθ
∗
m + q¯θ¯
∗
m.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Another major diﬀerence between the two regimes is in ex post project
selection. This diﬀerence becomes more significant when the development
level of an economy becomes higher such that the regime m relies more on
ex post selection.
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Proposition 14 The project termination rate under regime m increases
with a, i.e., ∂
∂a
q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m+q¯θ¯
∗
m
> 0; whereas the rate under regime s is a constant
0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When the development level is low, with imitation opportunities relying
on pre-screening, regime s can do well. However, when the development
level becomes higher such that imitation opportunities diminish, regime m’s
ex post screening mechanisms become more eﬀective. This explains why
regime s has lower steady-state development levels than regime m.
5 Catching-up Dynamics and Cycles
The catching up process is modelled as transition dynamics starting from
a below-steady-state development level towards the steady-state level. Un-
der diﬀerent financing mechanisms, some economies may converge to their
steady state faster than others; and the growth of some economies may be
cyclical (unstable).30
5.1 Convergence and Stability
The linearized growth equation (24) around their steady state (a¯, gf ) is thatµ
at+1 − a¯
gt+1 − gf
¶
≈


1 a¯1+gf
− ρBa¯
1+gf
B


µ
at − a¯
gt − gf
¶
, (30)
where C¯∗ (λ (a¯)) =
αw¯(δL−gf)
ρ(1+ρ)
B , δL− gf
ρ (1 + gf )
∂C¯∗
∂a¯
a¯
C¯∗
. (31)
Eq. (30) decomposes the cause of growth, (gt+1 − gf ), into two eﬀects: the
convergence eﬀect, − ρBa¯
1+gf
(at − a¯); and the growth inertia eﬀect,B (gt − gf ).
30The combination of a discrete-time setup and a flat capital supply diﬀerentiates our
model significantly from most techonological diﬀusion-based growth models (e.g., Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Chapter 8) in the dynamics of the system. Flat capital supply can
also arise in many situations, such as in a small economy with a free access to international
capital market where interest is almost exogenous.
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The common factor in the two eﬀects in the system (30) is B,which is a
measure of the ability to reserve the momentum of growth performance. We
call it the inertia factor. Moreover, B is observable as the auto-correlation
coeﬃcient of the growth rates. In the following we will first focus on impacts
of B on the dynamic system. Then in Section5.2 we will discuss on how B
is determined, the interaction between financing regimes and dynamics of
the system.
B determines the magnitude of the convergence eﬀect in the system
(30). When the current development level at is below a¯, an economy with
a higher B tends to invest more on R&D than other economies; whereas
when at is above a¯, then an economy with a higher B tends to reduce R&D
more than other economies. Moreover, B also determines the magnitude of
the growth inertia. An economy with a higher B may expect higher future
R&D capital costs (associated with more rapid exhaustion of opportunities
for imitation), hence a higher future valuation of current projects (capital
gain). Thus, when a higher B economy has a high (gt − gf ), it tends to
invest more on R&D, which drives an even faster growth in the future.
The combination of the above convergence eﬀect and inertia eﬀect de-
termines the speed of catching up and the stability of an economy. In a
catching-up phase (i.e., at < a¯ and gt > gf ), the two eﬀects work in the
same direction; therefore a higher B implies a higher speed of catching up.
However, when there is an overshooting (i.e., at > a¯ and gt > gf ), the
two eﬀects work in opposite directions and, importantly, the inertia eﬀect
dominates in a divergence direction. Thus, the inertia eﬀect ultimately de-
termines the stability of the system.
Proposition 15 IfB < 11+ρ , the steady state (a¯, gf ) is asymptotically stable
(it is a sink); if B ∈
³
φ, 11+ρ
´
, where φ = 1+2ρ−2
p
(ρ+ ρ2), the economy
spirals toward (a¯, gf ). If B > 11+ρ , the steady state (a¯, gf ) is unstable (it is
a source).31
Proof. The stability of the steady state (a¯, gf ) depends on the eigenvalues
of the matrix 

1 a¯1+gf
− ρBa¯
1+gf
B

 ,
31When B > 1
1+ρ , the economy may spiral toward limit cycles. In some of the numerical
examples in this and the next section, we simulate the limit cycles.
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which are:
r1 =
1
2
(B+ 1) +
1
2
√
η, r2 =
1
2
(B+ 1)− 1
2
√
η.
where η , B2−2B+1−4ρB. IfB < 11+ρ then |r1| < 1 and |r2| < 1, (a¯, gf )
is asymptotically stable; if B ∈
³
φ, 11+ρ
´
, the two eigen values are complex
with the norm being smaller than unity, (a¯, gf ) is a cyclical attractor. If
B > 11+ρ , then |r1| > 1 and |r2| > 1, (a¯, gf ) is unstable.
The essence of the above result is that when B is small, the inertia
eﬀect is weak, and an economy will converge to its steady-state level with-
out over-shooting; and when B is in the medium range, the inertia eﬀect
is strong enough to generate overshooting and contracting cycles, but not
strong enough to cause sustained cycles, which will occur when B is even
larger. Next, we analyze how an economy’s B aﬀects the economy’s conver-
gence speed by solving the growth path. We start from the asymptotically
stable case, i.e., B ∈ (0, φ). In this case, the two real eigenvalues of the
system are
r2 =
1
2
(B+ 1)− 1
2
√
η < r1 =
1
2
(B+ 1) +
1
2
√
η < 1
and ∂r1
∂B < 0. The associated eigenvectors are
v1 =


a¯( 12B−
1
2
−1
2
√
η)
ρB(1+gf)
1

 , v2 =


a¯( 12B−
1
2
+ 1
2
√
η)
ρB(1+gf)
1

 .
The solution confirms that when B is small, a higher B leads to a faster
convergence toward the steady-state development level a¯.
Proposition 16 If B ∈ (0, φ) and a0 < a¯ and g0 = gf , then when t is
suﬃciently large, at increases with B, i.e., ∂at∂B > 0, for at < a¯.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, we analyze the cases where the value of B is at the medium level
and the growth path is cyclical, i.e., B ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
, where φ , 1 + 2ρ +
2
p
(ρ+ ρ2). Within this range ofB values, the two eigen values are complex
r1 =
p
B (1 + ρ)ei cosω, r2 =
p
B (1 + ρ)e−i cosω
and their associated eigenvectors are
v1 =
Ã
a¯
√
ρB
ρB(1+gf)
e−iϕ
1
!
, v2 =
Ã
a¯
√
ρB
ρB(1+gf)
eiϕ
1
!
,
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where ω , arccos
µ
1
2
+ 1
2
B√
B(1+ρ)
¶
is the angular velocity, ϕ , arccos
³ 1
2
B− 1
2√
ρB
´
and the norm is |r1| =
p
B (1 + ρ). Some properties of ω and ϕ are the
following:
ϕ ∈ (0, π) and ∂ϕ
∂B
< 0; (32)
A useful approximate relation between ω and ϕ is given by
ω ≈
Ã
arccos
1p
(1 + ρ)
!
sinϕ, (33)
the derivation of which is provided in Appendix B. Solving the growth path
we find that with a medium value ofB, although the growth path is cyclical,
a higher B still leads to a faster catch up toward the steady-state position
a¯.
Proposition 17 If B ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
and a0 < a¯ and g0 = gf , then the catching-
up speed increases in B.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The essence of Propositions 15 to 17 is that economies with a larger iner-
tia factorB have a stronger convergence eﬀect and growth inertia; therefore,
they tend to catch up faster. But they are also more likely to overshoot their
steady-state targets. Relating these findings to the property of B, we have
the following empirically testable predictions.
Corollary 18 Ceteris paribus, economies with larger coeﬃcients of auto-
correlation in the growth rate tend to catch up faster, but they are more
likely to experience growth cycles.
The magnitude of the inertia factor B is determined by R&D selection
mechanisms used by financing regimes. In the next part we analyze the
growth dynamics of economies under regimes m and s.
5.2 Catching up and Stability Properties of Financing Regimes
From eq. (31) a key factor which determines B is ∂C¯
∗
∂a¯
a¯
C¯∗
, the steady-state
elasticity of R&D capital costs with respect to the development level. It
turns out the elasticity is aﬀected by the R&D selection mechanism used by
the financing regime.
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Lemma 19 Ceteris paribus, the R&D capital cost in both regimes, C¯∗ (λ (at))
increases in at, i.e.,
∂C¯∗(λ(at))
∂at
=
K∗ζ (λ(at))
λ(at)
λ0 (at) > 0, where ζ = s,m.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Using Lemma 19 and eq. (31) we obtain inertia factor B under diﬀerent
financing regimes
B =



Bs , δL−gf
ρ(1+gf)
λ0(a¯)a¯
λ(a¯) K
∗
s (λ (a¯)) under regime s,
Bm , δL−gf
ρ(1+gf)
λ0(a¯)a¯
λ(a¯) K
∗
m (λ (a¯)) under regime m.
(34)
To compare the dynamics of the two regimes, we study two economies
that are identical in every aspect except for a diﬀerence in financing regimes.
That is, we look at σ = σ∗ where the two regimes have identical steady state
a∗; and they start from the same initial values (a0, g0) where a0 < a∗. Then,
Proposition 20 implies that Bs > Bm.
Proposition 20 Bs > Bm at (a∗, σ∗).
Proof. By Proposition 12, if I3 > I˘3 then K∗s > K
∗
m at (a
∗, σ∗) ; conse-
quently, Bs > Bm at (a∗, σ∗) .
Given growth inertia factors Bs and Bm are observable as growth rate
auto-correlations, Proposition 20 not only makes testable predictions but
also, combined with some previous results, our model further predicts that
regime s (as compared to regime m) is more likely to fluctuate around its
steady state, which has a lower development level than regime m, although
it may catch up faster.
Proposition 21 For an economy with σ = σ∗ and starting from the initial
point (a0, g0) where a0 < a∗ and g0 = gf ,
(1) the growth path under regime s is more likely to be cyclical than that
under regime m.
(2) it converges to its steady state faster under regime s than under regime
m if Bs ≤ φ;
(3) it reaches the level of a∗ earlier under regime s than under regime m if
Bs ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As has been shown, regime s gives greater advantages to more backward
economies, in particular economies with higher σ values. Nevertheless, some
low σ backward economies may benefit from adopting regime s at their early
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stage of catching up as well. The following proposition characterizes an
optimal regime selection at diﬀerent development stages. At an early stage
of development, regime s is more eﬃcient and catches up faster. However,
as an economy approaches its steady-state development level, the financing
regime should be changed to regime m.
Proposition 22 For an economy with σ ∈ (0, σ∗], there exists a threshold
value a such that if a0 < a, the optimal financing regime is regime s when
at < a and regime m when at ≥ a.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Regime s is optimal at low development levels because it saves contract
enforcement costs and relies more on ex ante R&D selection, which is more
eﬀective at a low development level. When the development level is low,
the growth path of an economy under regime s is independent from σ (see
eq. 24) such that an economy with σ < σ∗ can grow like an economy with
σ ≥ σ∗. However, an economy with low σ can do better by switching to
regime m when it is close to its steady-state development level.
Simulation results (Example 29) are shown in Appendix C to illustrate
the above theoretical results.
6 Empirical and Policy Implications
A basic prediction of our theory on financing regimes (Proposition 20) is
that regime s has higher growth inertia B than regime m, where B is mea-
sured as the growth rate auto-correlations. Although systematic tests of
this prediction will be conducted during the next step of our research, some
preliminary observations seem to suggest that this prediction is consistent
with the data. Figure 4 in the following plots a lagged growth rate vs. the
growth rate for the CEE economies (as proxies for regime s) and the West
European (WE) economies (as proxies for regime m) for the period from
1950 to 2000.32 The figure suggests that after controlling for the conver-
gence eﬀect, the average B of the CEE economies is higher than that of the
WE economies: the slope for the CEE economies is positive, whereas the
slope for the WE economies is negative.
32To be more precise, the horizontal axis of the figure is the lagged 5-year-average growth
rate, and the vertical axis is the 5-year-average growth rate (net oﬀ the convergence eﬀect,
the adjustment of the U.S. 5-year-average growth rate, and the regression constant term).
30
g5_d_lag
 g5_ee  g5_pre_ee
 g5_we  g5_pre_we
-.1 -.05 0 .05
-.05
0
.05
.1
Figure 4: Growth rate auto-correlations: CEE vs WE economies
Based on Proposition 20, our model (e.g., Proposition 21, etc.) predicts
that regime s is more likely to fluctuate around the steady-state develop-
ment level, which is lower than that under regime m.33 To demonstrate
the empirical implications of these predictions we provide the following sim-
ulations.34 Using similar coordinates as those in Fig. 7 and 8 the vertical
axis is the diﬀerence between an economy’s growth rate and the world fron-
tiers, gt − gf ; and the horizontal axis is the ratio between the economy’s
development level and that of the world frontiers.
Fig. 5 is a simulation of regime m, which catches up first and then
converges to its steady-state development level with moderate overshooting.
Fig. 6 is a simulation of regime s for an economy with the same parameter
values as those for regime m. It demonstrates substantially larger growth
cycles around a lower steady-state development level. Although we leave
formal tests of the predictions of our model for future work, the simulated
growth patterns of the two financing regimes seem consistent with the ob-
served growth patterns of the two financing systems in Figures 7 and 8.
33Our model also predicts that the steady-state level of regime m is determined by
institutional factor σ such that an economy with a higher σ should have a lower steady-
state development level.
34All the parameter values of the simulation are presented in Example 30 of Appendix
C.
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Figure 6: A catch-up pattern of a regime s
With simultaneously endogenized financing and development, our model
has rich policy implications. However, a complete exploration of the policy
implications of the model is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we briefly
illustrate some of the implications.
In reality, the choice (or change) of financing regime may be aﬀected
by political institutions, legal restrictions, etc. For example, for a regime
s, where the economy’s development level has caught up to a level that is
close to its steady state, it is optimal to switch to regime m at this time.
However, this may not be implemented since some stakeholders who benefit
from regime s may have strong incentives to block a regime change. As a
result, the economy may decline after an overshooting, which may trigger
an economic/political crisis later. Therefore, a change of financial institution
may occur as a consequence of a political regime change. Related to this,
political regime changes (e.g., the collapse of centralized economies) or out-
side pressures (e.g., reform conditions imposed by international institutions
like the IMF) may result in a diﬀerent timing of regime change which can
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be much worse than than optimal. Our model derives some useful policy
implications from the above-mentioned scenario.
Example 23 . Consider an economy starting from a0 < a∗ < a¯ and g0 =
gf . The following examples show the impacts of deviations from the second-
best financing regime on the consequent development of the economy.
1. Optimal regime change: at first, regime s is chosen optimally, which
delivers a high speed of catching up. Then the regime is changed at the
optimal timing to regime m, which guarantees a stable convergence to
the steady-state development level and growth rate (Panel a and b of
Fig. 11 in Appendix C). After the regime change, the development
level keeps increasing toward the steady-state level, while there is a
moderate initial drop in the growth rate to adjust to the convergence
to the steady-state growth rate. Regarding in-house R&D as regime s
and venture-capital-financed R&D as regime m, this may shed some
light on the impact of the rise of venture capital in the U.S. economy
since the 1970s.
2. Late regime change: A reform takes place at the end of a positive
overshooting (Panel c and d of Fig. 11 in Appendix C). Immediately
after the regime change, there is a sharp drop in the growth rate which
makes the development level decline as well. Then there is a recovery of
growth and the development level. Interpreting a centralized financial
system as regime s, this may shed some light on the impact of failing
to reform the financial system on time, as well as on the sharp decline
of the transition economies after the change in financial systems.
3. Very late regime change: the regime change takes place at the end of
a negative overshooting (Panel e and f of Fig. 11 in Appendix C).
Although the economy suﬀered low growth during the negative over-
shooting, immediately after the regime change there was a second sharp
drop in the growth rate. This may reflect the experience of some of the
transition economies.
7 Conclusion
Our model suggests that under certain conditions related to legal institu-
tions, some financial systems may be better than others in allowing an econ-
omy to catch up faster. The same underlying force, however, may also result
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in large growth cycles around lower steady-state development levels if finan-
cial reform lags behind growth needs. Therefore, the timing of financial
system reforms (e.g., financial liberalization) can play a critical role. More-
over, our model implies that changes in the financial regime of an economy
should be conditional on the legal institutions in that economy. When legal
institutions are very weak, the promotion of financial liberalization may im-
pair the economy. This can shed some light on the problems of the former
centralized economies and their transition.
Our theory takes the decades-long debates on financial development and
economic development,35 on alternative financial institutions one step fur-
ther. It also provides alternative explanations for some important recent
discoveries, such as the ‘irrelevance’ of financial structures (Beck and Levine,
2002).
Furthermore, our theory has implications for the convergence/divergence
debate (e.g., Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Quah, 1996; Barro, 1997). We
predict that when convergence will occur is conditional on the financial
institutions and legal conditions.
Finally, our model focuses on one important aspect of the mechanisms of
financial institutions - R&D project financing/selection. We are fully aware
that financial institutions have other important features, such as aﬀecting
capital investment in general, and aﬀecting risk sharing between households
and firms (Allen and Gale, 2000), etc. To make our point clear with a simple
model, we abstract from many other mechanisms of financial institutions.
These factors will be incorporated into our model in the future.
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Figure 7: Catching-up patterns of France, Italy, Belgium, and Austria
Table 1. Total R&D Expenditure, 1967-85 (Percentage of GNP)
US Japan WE USSR Czech Hungary
1967 3.07 1.58 1.78 3.0 2.9(a) 1.8(a)
1975 2.38 2.01 1.81 3.5 3.1(a) 2.8(a)
1982 2.69 2.47 2.04 3.6
1985 2.68(b) 2.80(b) 5.0(c)
Note: All the data in the table include both military and civilian sectors.
Source: Hanson and Pavitt (1987), Table 2, p.53.
(a) Poznanski (1985), Table 1, p.53.
(b) National Science Board (1989), Table 4-19, p.96.
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Figure 8: Catching-up pattern of the USSR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
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(c) Linz and Thorton (1988).
Table 2. Civilian Sector R&D Expenditure Comparison (percentage of
GNP)
US Japan France West Germany UK USSR
1967 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.4
Note: Defense and space sector R&D expenditures excluded for all coun-
tries.
Source: Bergson (1989), Table 11, p.125.
Table 3. Scientists and Engineers in R&D, USSR vs. U.S.
USSR
million
U.S.
million
USSR
per 10,000 workers
U.S.
per 10,000 workers
1950 1.25 1.59 14.7 26.2
1960 2.73 3.81 27.5 55.8
1970 6.62 5.47 54.2 66.8
1975 8.74 5.35 66.0 61.5
Note: Scientists and engineers in both countries exclude humanities spe-
cialists, social scientists, and psychologists.
Source: Bergson (1989), Table 12, p.126.
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A Appendix A
Assumptions
A-1: I2+ I31+ρ+
w¯
1+ρ >
δαLw¯
ρ
(the cost of a bad project at stage 2 is higher
than the upper bound of profit).
A-2: I1 + I2 + w¯1+ρ ≥
I3
1+ρ (the cost of a bad project at stage 3 is lower
than the cost of a good project).
A-3: I3+F1+ρ >
δαLw¯
ρ
(the cost of a bad project at stage 3, conditional on
regime m, is more expensive than the upper bound of profit).
To prove Lemma 1, let us first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 24 From assumptions A-1, A-2, and A-3, it follows that in any
equilibrium with a positive growth rate,
(1) I2 + I31+ρ +
w¯
1+ρ > δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ >
I3
1+ρ
(2) I1 + I2 + w¯1+ρ < δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ .
(3) δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ <
I3+F
1+ρ
Proof. Since πτ = αL1tw¯1+ρ and L1t ≤ L, δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ ≤ δαLw¯ρ
holds, i.e., δαLw¯
ρ
is an upper bound to the expected profit of a project in
any equilibrium with a positive growth rate. Consequently, from A-1 and
A-2, it follows that I2 + I31+ρ +
w¯
1+ρ >
δαLw¯
ρ
≥ δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ >
I1+ I2+
w¯
1+ρ ≥
I3
1+ρ , which implies (1). On the other hand, since the cost of
a good project, i.e., I1+ I2+ w¯1+ρ , is a lower bound to the expected profit of
a project in any equilibrium with a positive growth rate, i.e., I1+I2+ w¯1+ρ <
δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ , then (2) holds. Finally by A-3, I3+F1+ρ >
δαLw¯
ρ
≥
δ
P∞
τ=t+1 (1 + ρ)
−(τ−t)
πτ holds, which implies (3).
Sketch of proof of Lemma 1: Applying the above result (3), if ex
ante some financiers decide to finance a project jointly, an entrepreneur, who
discovers that the project is bad at stage 1 will stop it right away to avoid a
costly liquidation at stage 2, since for the entrepreneur the private benefits
are b1 > b2. As a result, under multi-financier financing, all bad projects
will be terminated at date 1.
However, if a project is financed by one financier, when the financier dis-
covers that the project is a bad one at stage 2, given that earlier investments
are sunk, according to the above result (2), continuing the bad project is
ex post profitable, the financier will choose to refinance the project. Antici-
pating this, at stage 1 when an entrepreneur with a bad project realizes the
type of the project, the entrepreneur will not report the private information
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about the type of the project. Thus, the financier will always refinance a
bad project.36
B Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 4
First consider regime s. Since C¯s is not a function of σ, it follows that
∂θ∗s
∂σ
= 0, ∂C¯
∗
s
∂σ
= 0 and ∂K
∗
s
dσ
= 0.
Under regime m, there is an interior optimal precision θ∗m for λ >
0 (Lemma 25). At the point θm = θ∗m, the derivative
∂C¯∗m
∂σ
= ∂C¯m
∂σ
=
qθ+q¯θ¯
qθm
F > 0. Diﬀerentiating the equation ∂C¯
∗
m
∂θm
= 0 w.r.t. σ and reor-
ganizing, it follows that ∂θ
∗
m
dσ
= q¯F
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
> 0 and ∂K
∗
m
∂σ
= ∂K
∗
m
∂θ
∂θ∗m
∂σ
=
λψ0(θ∗m)θ∗m−λψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗2m
q¯F
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
> 0.
Now consider the special case: σ = 0. In the following we are going to
show the R&D capital cost is lower under regime m, i.e., C¯∗m < C¯
∗
s , where
C¯∗s = K
∗
s +
q¯θ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
I3
1+ρ+I1+I2+
w¯
1+ρ and C¯
∗
m = K
∗
m+
qθ∗m+q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m
I1+I2+
w¯
1+ρ .
The comparison is not straightforward, and the plan for doing it is to
find a suboptimal level of prescreening, Km, under regime m such that
the corresponding R&D capital cost C¯m is strictly lower than C¯∗s , i.e.,
C¯∗m ≤ C¯m < C¯∗s .
Let Km be chosen such that Km = K∗s , i.e.,
λψ(θm)
qθm
= λψ(θ
∗
s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
. Then
C¯m− C¯∗s = q¯θ¯mqθm I1−
q¯θ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
I3
1+ρ =
q¯θ¯m
qθm
³
I1 − qθ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
θm
θ¯m
I3
1+ρ
´
. It follows from
reorganizing λψ(θm)
qθm
= λψ(θ
∗
s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
that ψ (θm)
¡
qθ∗s + q¯θ¯
∗
s
¢
= ψ (θ∗s) qθm. It is
useful to solve for θm (approximately) by linearizing the left-hand side of the
equation around θ∗s:
¡
ψ (θ∗s) + ψ
0 (θ∗s) (θm − θ∗s)
¢ ¡
qθ∗s + q¯θ¯
∗
s
¢
≈ ψ (θ∗s) qθm,
which gives rise to θm ≈
(ψ0(θ∗s)θ∗s−ψ(θ∗s))(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)
ψ0(θ∗s)(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)−ψ(θ∗s)q
. With this result, we can
approximate the term qθ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
θm
θ¯m
and derive that following:
qθ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
θm
θ¯m
≈ q ψ
0(θ∗s)θ∗s−ψ(θ∗s)
ψ0(θ∗s)θ∗s−ψ(θ∗s)+(ψ0(θ∗s)(1−2θ∗s)+2ψ(θ∗s))q¯
.
The term ψ
0(θ∗s)θ∗s−ψ(θ∗s)
ψ0(θ∗s)θ∗s−ψ(θ∗s)+(ψ0(θ∗s)(1−2θ∗s)+2ψ(θ∗s))q¯
turns out to be bounded by
1 from below, which is equivalent to ψ (θ∗s) − ψ0 (θ∗s)
¡
θ∗s − 12
¢
≤ 0. To see
this, note that by the mean value theorem, ψ (θ∗s)−ψ
¡
1
2
¢
= ψ0
³
θ˜
´ ¡
θ∗s − 12
¢
36The first and second parts of this lemma are variations of Dewatripont and Maskin
(1995) and Huang and Xu (2003) respectively, with working assumptions of reduced form
transaction cost and A-3.
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where θ˜ ∈
£
1
2 , θ
∗
s
¤
. It follows that ψ0
³
θ˜
´
≤ ψ0 (θ∗s) due to the assump-
tion that ψ00 (·) > 0 (by A-5). Then ψ (θ∗s) − ψ
¡
1
2
¢
= ψ0
³
θ˜
´ ¡
θ∗s − 12
¢
≤
ψ0 (θ∗s)
¡
θ∗s − 12
¢
, which implies that ψ (θ∗s)−ψ0 (θ∗s)
¡
θ∗s − 12
¢
≤ 0. The useful
implication of this result is that (conditional on the approximation error
being suﬃciently small) qθ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
θm
θ¯m
> q, hence,
C¯∗m − C¯∗s ≤ C¯m − C¯∗s ≤ q¯θ¯mqθm
³
I1 − q I31+ρ
´
< 0 since q I31+ρ > I1 (by A-4).
Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by σ˜ (λ) the solution to C¯∗s = C¯
∗
m for a given λ > 0. Lemma
4 suggests that C¯∗s > C¯
∗
m as σ = 0 and
∂C¯∗m
∂σ
> 0. It is also easy to verify
that C¯∗m → ∞ as σ → ∞. Then it follows that σ˜ (λ) exists (by the mean-
value theorem) and is unique. Consequently, according to Proposition 3 and
Lemma 4, C¯∗s < C¯
∗
m and ζ
∗ = s if and only if σ > σ˜ (λ).
Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose at equilibrium the steady-state level of relative development is
a = a¯, but there exists a˜ > a¯ which can be achieved by an alternative
financing regime, denoted by ζ, in the steady state. Hence, C¯∗ζ (a˜;σ) =
C¯∗ (a¯;σ) = C¯∗f (by Lemma 7) and C¯
∗
ζ (a¯;σ) < C¯
∗ (a¯;σ) (by Proposition 19).
Combining the two conditions gives rise to C¯∗ζ (a¯;σ) < C¯
∗
ζ (a˜;σ) and applying
Proposition 19 again, we have a¯ < a˜, which contradicts the assumption that
a˜ > a¯.
Proof of Lemma 12
For each value of I3 equationK∗s = K
∗
m define a curve σk (a; I3) which di-
vides the (a, σ) space, (see Figure 9) and σk (a; I3) increases in I3 (see Lemma
27). Define I˘3 , inf {I3 : σk (a; I3) ≥ σss (a) for all a ∈ (0, 1)}. Since σk (a; I3)
increases in I3, σk (a; I3)→∞ as I3 →∞ and σss (a) is finite, it follows that
I˘3 is finite. So σk (a; I3) > σss (a) as I3 > I˘3 (by definition), which implies
that K∗s > K
∗
m along the σss (a) curve for a > 0.
Proof of Proposition 13
In the steady state, regime m is associated with σ ≤ σ∗ and a¯ ≥ a∗,
regime s is associated with a¯ = a∗; if I3 > I˘3 then K∗m < K
∗
s (by Proposition
12). Consequently, θ∗m < θ
∗
s and qθ
∗
m < qθ
∗
s+q¯θ¯
∗
s. Finally, the fact
∂(qθ+q¯θ¯)
∂θ
<
0 as q < 12 implies that qθ
∗
m + q¯θ¯
∗
m > qθ
∗
s + q¯θ¯
∗
s as q <
1
2 .
Proof of Proposition 14
The algebraic fact ∂
∂θ
q¯θ¯
qθ+q¯θ¯
=
−q¯(qθ+q¯θ¯)−q¯θ¯(q−q¯)
(qθ+q¯θ¯)
2 =
−q¯q
(qθ+q¯θ¯)
2 < 0 is to be
used, together with Lemma 25 and A-5, to derive the following:
∂
∂a
q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m+q¯θ¯
∗
m
=
³
∂
∂λ
q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m+q¯θ¯
∗
m
´
λ0 (a) =
³
∂
∂θ∗m
q¯θ¯
∗
m
qθ∗m+q¯θ¯
∗
m
´
∂θ∗m
∂λ
λ0 (a) > 0.
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Figure 9: σk > σss as I3 > I˘3
Proof of Proposition 16
We first solve the growth path through the following steps.
Step 1: The general (non-periodical) solution of the linear equation system
is
µ
at
gt
¶
=
µ
a¯
gf
¶
+
¡
v1 v2
¢µ rt1 0
0 rt2
¶µ
C1
C2
¶
.
Step 2: Consider an initial value
µ
a0
g0
¶
such that a0 < a¯ and g0 = gf ,
which determines that
µ
C1
C2
¶
=
¡
v1 v2
¢−1µ a0 − a¯
0
¶
. It is easy to
verify that¡
v1 v2
¢−1
= −ρB(1+gf)
a¯
√
η


1 − a¯(
1
2
(B−1)+ 1
2
√
η)
ρB(1+gf)
−1 a¯(
1
2
(B−1)−1
2
√
η)
ρB(1+gf)

 , and it follows that
µ
C1
C2
¶
= −ρB(1+gf)
a¯
√
η
µ
(a0 − a¯)
− (a0 − a¯)
¶
.
Step 3: The special solution then isµ
at
gt
¶
=
µ
a¯
gf
¶
− ρB(1+gf)(a0−a¯)
a¯
√
η
¡
rt1v1 − rt2v2
¢
=
µ
a¯
gf
¶
− ρB(1+gf)(a0−a¯)
a¯
√
η
rt1
µ
v1 −
³
r2
r1
´t
v2
¶
.
Since
³
r2
r1
´t
≈ 0 as t is suﬃciently large, thenµ
at − a¯
gt − gf
¶
≈ −ρB(1+gf)(a0−a¯)
a¯
√
η
rt1v1 .That is,
µ
at − a¯
gt − gf
¶
converges to
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µ
0
0
¶
along the straight line projected by the eigenvector v1.
In particular, at = a¯− 12 (a¯− a0) rt1
µ³
1−B√
η
+ 1
´
−
³
r2
r1
´t ³
1−B√
η
− 1
´¶
< a¯
Approximately, at ≈ a¯− 12 (a¯− a0) rt1
³
1−B√
η
+ 1
´
since
³
r2
r1
´t
≈ 0 as t is suﬃciently large.
∂at
∂B ≈ −
1
2 (a¯− a0) r
t−1
1
Ã
t
³
1−B√
η
+ 1
´
∂r1
∂B
(−)
+ r1
∂
∂B
³
1−B√
η
´!
> 0
as t is suﬃciently large.
Derivation of the approximate relation between ω and ϕ
Recall the definitions of ω and ϕ : ω , arccos
µ
1
2
+1
2
B√
B(1+ρ)
¶
and ϕ ,
arccos
³ 1
2
B− 1
2√
ρB
´
Solve
√
B as a function of ϕ as follows,
√
B =
√
ρ (cosϕ)+
p
(ρ (cosϕ) + 1)therefore,
ω = arccos
1+ρ cos2 ϕ+
√
ρ(cosϕ)
√
(ρ cos2 ϕ+1)³√
ρ cosϕ+
√
(ρ cos2 ϕ+1)
´√
(1+ρ)
Denote cosϕ by Φ so that : ω = arccos
1+ρΦ2+√ρΦ
√
(ρΦ2+1)³√
ρΦ+
√
(ρΦ2+1)
´√
(1+ρ)
=
arccos
1+ρΦ2+√ρΦ
√
(ρΦ2+1)µ
√ρΦ+
√
(ρΦ2+1)
¶√
(1+ρ)
√
1−Φ2 sinϕ
Linearizing
arccos
1+ρΦ2+√ρΦ
√
(ρΦ2+1)µ
√ρΦ+
√
(ρΦ2+1)
¶√
(1+ρ)
√
1−Φ2 around Φ = 0
arccos
1+ρΦ2+√ρΦ
√
(ρΦ2+1)µ
√ρΦ+
√
(ρΦ2+1)
¶√
(1+ρ)
√
1−Φ2 ≈ arccos
1√
(1+ρ)
+ 0Φ
ω ≈
µ
arccos 1√
(1+ρ)
¶
sinϕ
Proof of Proposition 17
Step 1: The general (periodical) solution of the linear equation system
isµ
at
gt
¶
=
µ
a¯
gf
¶
+
³p
B (1 + ρ)
´tÃ a¯√ρB
ρB(1+gf)
e−iϕ a¯
√
ρB
ρB(1+gf)
eiϕ
1 1
!µ
eitω 0
0 e−itω
¶µ
C1
C2
¶
.
Step 2: Consider an initial value
µ
a0
g0
¶
such that a0 < a¯ and g0 = gf , then
we have
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µ
C1
C2
¶
=
Ã
a¯
√
ρB
ρB(1+gf)
e−iϕ a¯
√
ρB
ρB(1+gf)
eiϕ
1 1
!−1µ
a0 − a¯
0
¶
=
ρB(1+gf)(a0−a¯)
2a¯
√
ρB sinϕ
µ
i
−i
¶
.
Step 3: the special solution isµ
at
gt
¶
=

 a¯+
³p
B (1 + ρ)
´t
(a¯−a0)
sinϕ sin (tω − ϕ)
gf +
³p
B (1 + ρ)
´t
(a¯−a0)
sinϕ
√
ρB(1+gf)
a¯
sin (tω)

 . The trajec-
tory is a clockwise spiral around the steady state. The time for the trajec-
tory to pass at = a¯ from the left for the first time is the solution to the
equation:
tω − ϕ = 0 ⇒ t = τ , ϕ
ω
, the smaller τ , the faster the speed of catching
up. The following proposition reports the result for medium-range values
of B that an economy with a larger B has a faster catching up. Using the
approximation: ω ≈
µ
arccos 1√
(1+ρ)
¶
sinϕ, it follows that ∂τ
∂B =
∂
∂B
ϕ
ω
≈
∂
∂B
ϕµ
arccos 1√
(1+ρ)
¶
sinϕ
= 1µ
arccos 1√
(1+ρ)
¶³ ∂
∂B
ϕ
sinϕ
´
(+)
∂ϕ
∂B
(−)
< 0 as B ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
.
Proof of Proposition 19
In Lemma 25 we establish that
∂C¯∗ζ
∂λ
> 0 for ζ = s,m. Noticing that
K∗s , λψ(θ
∗
s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
, K∗m , λψ(θ
∗
m)
qθ∗m
, λ = λ (at) and C¯∗ = min
¡
C¯∗s , C¯
∗
m
¢
, it follows
that under regime s, ∂C¯
∗(λ(at))
∂at
= ∂C¯
∗
s
∂λ
λ0 (at) =
K∗s
λ(at)
λ0 (at) > 0; under regime
m, ∂C¯
∗(λ(at))
∂at
= dC¯
∗
m
dλ
λ0 (at) =
K∗m
λ(at)
λ0 (at) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 21
When I3 > I˘3, for an economy with σ = σ∗, Bs > Bm in the steady
state (Lemma 12).
If Bs ≤ φ then Bm < φ. By Proposition 16 ∂at∂B > 0 as B < φ for suﬃciently
large t, which implies that at,s > at,m, i.e., the speed to converge to the
steady state is faster under regime s, where at,s and at,h are the values of at
under regime s and regime m.
If Bs ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
then Bm < φ. By Proposition 17 ∂τ∂B < 0 as B ∈
¡
φ, φ
¢
;
therefore τ s < τm if τm is finite, where τ s and τm are the values of τ under
regime s and regime m respectively. As a result, at,s reaches a∗ earlier than
at,m.
It is possible that Bs > φ > Bm but not the reverse. Consequently, by
Proposition 15 the growth rate is more likely to be cyclical under regime s
than under regime m.
Proof of Proposition 22
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Define a such that σc (a) = σ ≤ σ∗ and a ≤ a∗. By Proposition 5 regime
s is chosen when a0 ≤ at < a and regime m is chosen when a ≤ at < a¯
where a¯ ≥ a∗ by Proposition 11.
Lemma 25 For λ > 0 there is a unique interior solution, θ∗ζ ∈ (1/2, 1),
to the minimization problem: minθζ C¯ζ for ζ = s,m, with the following
comparative statics:
∂θ∗ζ
∂λ
< 0,
∂C¯∗ζ
∂λ
> 0 and
∂2C¯∗ζ
∂λ2
< 0.
Proof. First consider the case: ζ = m. C¯m =
λψ(θm)
qθm
+ qθm+q¯θ¯m
qθm
(σF + I1)+
I2 +
w¯
1+ρ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in θm. At the point θm = 1/2,
C¯m is finite; the derivative ∂C¯m∂θm = 2
λψ0( 12)
q
− 4 q¯
q
(I1 + σF ) is negative since
λ ≤ 2q¯I1
ψ0( 12)
(by assumption A-5). If the solution to ∂C¯m
∂θm
= 0 does not exist, it
must be the case that ∂C¯m
∂θm
< 0 for all θm ≤ [1/2, 1] and hence, C¯m is smaller
at θm = 1 than θm = 1/2; but this contradicts the fact that C¯m is positive
infinity at θm = 1. So we conclude that an interior solution to ∂C¯m∂θm = 0 must
exist; let it be denoted by θ∗m. At the point θm = θ
∗
m, using the equation
implied by ∂C¯m
∂θm
= 0, we can write down the second order derivative in the
simple form: ∂
2C¯∗m
∂θ2m
= λψ
00(θ∗m)θ∗2m
qθ∗3m
, which is positive. Thereby, we infer that
the interior critical point (solution to ∂C¯m
∂θm
= 0) is unique (otherwise, at least
one of the solutions is not a local minimum, which contradicts the fact that
∂2C¯m
∂θ2m
> 0 at each of the solutions) and is the global minimum.
Now we focus attention to the point θ = θ∗m. Diﬀerentiating the equation
∂C¯∗m
∂θ
= 0 w.r.t. λ and reorganizing, it follows that ∂θ
∗
m
∂λ
= ψ(θ
∗
m)−ψ0(θ∗m)θ∗m
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
<
0. Now it is straightforward to derive the following comparative statics:
∂C¯∗m
∂λ
= ∂C¯m
∂λ
+ ∂C¯m
∂θm
dθ∗m
dλ
= ∂C¯m
∂λ
= ψ(θ
∗
m)
qθ∗m
> 0 and ∂
2C¯∗m
∂λ2
= ∂
∂λ
³
ψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
´
=
d
dθ∗m
³
ψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
´
∂θ∗m
∂λ
< 0.
The same argument goes through for the case: ζ = s. Some particular points
we need to make are that λ < 2qq¯I3
ψ0( 12)(1+ρ)
is satisfied as (1 + ρ) I3 > I1q (by
A-4)) and λ ≤ 2q¯I1
ψ0( 12)
(by A-5); that ∂C¯
∗
s
∂λ
= ∂C¯s
∂λ
= ψ(θ
∗
s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
.
Lemma 26 ∂θ
∗
s
∂I1
= 0, ∂θ
∗
s
∂I3
> 0, ∂K
∗
s
∂I1
= 0, ∂K
∗
s
∂I3
> 0 and ∂C¯
∗
s
∂I3
> 0 as λ > 0;
∂θ∗m
∂I1
> 0, ∂θ
∗
m
∂I3
= 0, ∂K
∗
m
∂I1
> 0, ∂K
∗
m
∂I3
= 0 as λ > 0.
Proof. For the case of regime s, the starting point for deriving the set of
comparative statics is the FOC: ∂C¯s
∂θ
= 0, or more precisely,
λψ0(θ∗s)(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)−λψ(θ∗s)(q−q¯)
qq¯
=
48
I3
1+ρ . Diﬀerentiating the both sides of the equation w.r.t. I1 and I3 respec-
tively and reorganizing, it follows that
λψ00(θ∗s)(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)
qq¯
∂θ∗s
∂I1
= 0⇒ ∂θ
∗
s
∂I1
= 0;
λψ00(θ∗s)(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)
qq¯
∂θ∗s
∂I3
= 11+ρ ⇒
∂θ∗s
∂I3
= qq¯
(1+ρ)λψ00(θ∗s)(qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s)
> 0.
Also ∂K
∗
s
∂I1
= ∂
∂I1
λψ(θ∗s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
= ∂
∂θ∗s
λψ(θ∗s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
∂θ∗s
∂I1
= 0,
∂K∗s
∂I3
= ∂
∂I3
λψ(θ∗s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
= ∂
∂θ∗s
λψ(θ∗s)
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
∂θ∗s
∂I3
> 0 and dC¯
∗
s
dI3
= ∂C¯
∗
s
∂I3
= q¯θ¯
∗
s
qθ∗s+q¯θ¯
∗
s
1
1+ρ > 0
For the case of regimem, the FOC, ∂C¯
∗
m
∂θ
= 0 implies that λψ
0(θ∗m)θ∗m−λψ(θ∗m)
q¯
=
I1 + σF .
Diﬀerentiating the both sides of the equation w.r.t. I1 and I3 respectively
and reorganizing, it follows that
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
q¯
∂θ∗m
∂I1
= 1⇒ ∂θ
∗
m
∂I1
= q¯
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
> 0 and
λψ00(θ∗m)θ∗m
q¯
∂∗m
∂I3
= 0⇒ ∂θ
∗
m
∂I3
= 0. Consequently,
∂K∗m
∂I1
= ∂
∂I1
λψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
= ∂
∂θ∗m
λψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
∂θ∗m
∂I1
> 0
and ∂K
∗
m
∂I3
= ∂
∂I3
λψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
= ∂
∂θ∗m
λψ(θ∗m)
qθ∗m
∂θ∗m
∂I3
= 0.
Lemma 27 ∂σk
∂I3
> 0 and ∂σss
∂I3
= 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the equation K∗m = K
∗
s w.r.t. to σ and I3 and
reorganizing, it results in ∂σk
∂I3
=
∂K∗s
∂I3
∂K∗m
∂σ
> 0 since ∂K
∗
m
∂σ
> 0 and ∂K
∗
s
∂I3
> 0 (by
Lemma 4 and 26). Also, since I3 does aﬀect regime m at all, it is obvious
that ∂σss
∂I3
= 0.
Lemma 28 The steady state (0, g˜) where g˜ , ρ(1+ρ)
αw¯
¡
C¯∗ (λ (a¯))− C¯∗ (λ (0))
¢
+
gf , is unstable.
Proof. Linearizing the growth equation (24) around (0, g˜) results inµ
at+1
gt+1 − g˜
¶
≈
µ
B1 0
−B2 0
¶Ã
at
gt −
³
ρ(1+ρ)
αw¯
¡
C¯∗ (λ (a¯))− C¯∗ (λ (0))
¢
+ gf
´ !,
where B1 = 1 +
ρ(1+ρ)
αw¯ (C¯
∗(λ(a¯))−C¯∗(λ(0)))
1+gf
and B2 =
ρ(1+ρ)
αw¯
∂C¯∗(λ(0))
∂λ
¡
λ0 (0)
¢
.
The transition matrix
µ
B1 0
−B2 0
¶
has eigenvalues: B1, 0. Since B1 > 1,
the steady state (0, g˜) is unstable.
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Example 29 See panels a, b, and c of Fig. 10, which correspond to the
following three cases:
a) Bm (σ∗) < Bs < φ: both regimes have a monotonic catch up; regime
s is faster in catching up and is the optimal regime.
b) Bm (σ∗)φ < Bs < 11+ρ : regime s catches up faster than regime m,
with spirals converging to the steady state; the optimal regime starts
with regime s and switches to regime m before the cycles start.
c) Bm < φ < 11+ρ < Bs < φ: regime s catches up faster at first and
converges to limit cycles. The optimal regime starts with regime s and
switches to regime m before the cycles start.
The following are the common parameter values and derived values for
1
1+ρ , φ and φ for all the above simulations.
α I1 I2 I3 λ (a) gf ρ
1
1+ρ φ φ
0.3 0.1 0.9 2 γ
0
a5/2 0.03 0.05 0.952 0.642 1.558
50
The following are the values of parameters q, γ
0
and δL and the calcu-
lated corresponding values of the variables for the above three simulated
cases.
q γ
0
δL a∗ σ∗ Bm (σ∗) Bs
a) 0.4 0.06 0.398 0.241 .0996 0.3009 0.611
b) 0.3 0.07 0.4125 0.246 .144 0.3756 0.9255
c) 0.29 0.071 0.4415 0.246 .150 0.400 0.968
Example 23 All the simulations share the same following parameters:
α I1 I2 I3 λ (a) gf ρ q δL
0.3 0.1 0.9 2 0.071a5/2 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.415
The corresponding variable values are as follows:
a∗ σ∗ Bm (σ∗) Bs
0.246 0.150 0.400 0.968
Interpretation of panels a-f of Figure 11
a) Development levels under an optimal regime.
b) Growth rates under an optimal regime.
c) Development level with a regime that changes after the 1st overshooting.
d) Growth rate with a regime that changes after the 1st overshooting.
e) Development level with a regime that changes at the bottom of at.
f) Growth rates with a regime that changes at the end of negative overshooting.
Example 30 The key feature of the growth pattern is the possible clockwise
spiral, which is the joint product of the convergence eﬀect and the growth
inertia eﬀect. In the absence of the growth inertia eﬀect, the growth path
tends to converge to the steady state (a∗, gf ) monotonically; but the growth
inertia eﬀect tends to prevent gt from converging to gf as at approaches a∗
and causes possible overshooting.
All the simulations share the same following parameters:
α I1 I2 I3 λ (a) gf ρ q δL
0.3 0.3 0.9 1.7 0.18a5/2 0.03 0.05 0.4 0.485
The corresponding variable values are as follows:
σ a¯ Bm σ
∗ a∗ Bs a0 g0
0.05 0.55 0.68 0.169 0.257 0.94 0.15 0.03
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Figure 11: Regime change and development
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